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Exceptions
Frederick Schauerf
It seems commonly supposed that exceptions are to law what
electric windows are to automobiles-useful accessories but hardly
central to the enterprise. Exceptions to statutes, regulations, com-
mon law rules, and constitutional tests are of course everywhere in
the law, a few of the innumerable examples being the good faith
exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule,' the collat-
eral order exception to the final judgment rule,2 the "capable of
repetition, yet evading review" exception to the mootness doc-
trine,' the market participant exception to the constitutional ban
on state protectionism,4 the state action exemption in antitrust
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2 See, for example, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v Risjord, 449 US 368 (1981); Cohen v
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 US 541 (1949).
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law," and the numerous exceptions to the hearsay rule.' But al-
though exceptions are an omnipresent feature of the legal terrain,
their. very pervasiveness appears to prompt the view that excep-
tions are but adjuncts to what is really important. However useful
it may be to consider specific exceptions in particular doctrinal
realms, thinking about exceptions as such does not get us very far
in thinking about law.
This view about the unimportance of the exception as a dis-
crete jurisprudential phenomenon is never stated explicitly. In-
deed, the exception is an invisible topic in legal theory, thus distin-
guishing it from such thoroughly analyzed concepts as precedent
and legislative intent. Implicit in this lack of attention seems to be
an understanding that no interesting generalizations are to be de-
rived about the exceptions that surface almost everywhere
throughout most legal systems.
I believe this understanding rests on a confused notion of the
logical status of an exception. Probing that status prompts the re-
alization that there is no logical distinction between exceptions and
what they are exceptions to, their occurrence resulting from the
often fortuitous circumstance that the language available to cir-
cumscribe a legal rule or principle is broader than the regulatory
goals the rule or principle is designed to further. As products of the
relationship between legal goals and the language in which law
happens to be written, exceptions show how the meaning of a legal
rule is related to the meaning of the language that law employs.
This relationship is an important subject in its own right, and I
will say something about it.7 But the relationship is only one com-
ponent of the even larger relationship between law and a back-
ground social landscape whose most important elements are the
language a society uses and the categories it deploys to carve up
the world. In important ways exceptions link law to its linguistic
and categorial underpinnings, situating law in a world it both re-
flects and on which it is imposed.
The use (or not) of exceptions can thus tell us more than we
have traditionally thought about how law is located in a linguistic
and categorial world. But that location is contingent, and conse-
See Parker v Brown, 317 US 341 (1943).
See FRE 803, 804.
See H.L.A. Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, in H.L.A. Hart, Essays in
Jurisprudence and Philosophy 21 (Oxford, 1983); Mary Jane Morrison, Excursions into the
Nature of Legal Language, 37 Cleve St L Rev 271 (1989). For further discussion see text at
notes 39-47.
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quently what is at some time or place a broad rule with an accom-
panying exception is at other times a narrow rule having no need
for an exception to perform the same prescriptive task. Failure to
understand the contingency of this relationship, however, often
leads substantive debates of policy or principle to hide behind
pseudo-logical claims that one side or the other has, by urging an
exception, taken the low road of ad hoc expedience rather than the
high road of principle. Once we see the fortuity of exceptions and
the contingency of the circumstances in which they exist, however,
arguments about who is upholding the principle and who is urging
an exception become trivial, and so are less likely to obscure the
substantive debate.
The lesson that comes from exposing the logical emptiness of
exceptions is yet larger, because after that exposure it is no longer
possible to believe that exceptions are epiphenomenal adjuncts to
the rules they are exceptions to, such that the power to append an
exception does not undercut the primary force of the rule itself.,
But if the phenomenon of the exception is not logically distinct,
and rules and their exceptions occupy the same plane, then we
cannot view the power to create exceptions as marginal. Rather,
the relationship between the power to create exceptions and the
basis for doing so becomes an essential element of the extent of
rule-based constraint itself. Much of the picture of a legal system,
and much that makes some legal systems different from others,
therefore hinges on the power to create exceptions, for that power
turns out to be the power both to change rules and to avoid their
constraints.
In supporting these claims, I will start with an example from
the Securities Act of 1933, turn to the obsolete criminal law prohi-
bition on fornication, and then move to some questions about the
definition of First Amendment principles in the context of flag des-
ecration, Nazi speech, and pornography. Drawing on such diverse
areas, I hope to show the pervasiveness of the phenomenon I set
out to explore.
I. WHEN THE RIGHT WORDS DON'T EXIST
According to § 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, it is "unlawful
for any person . . .to sell [an unregistered] security through the
use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise."9 Yet pursuant to
8 See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 136 (Oxford, 1961).
' 15 USC § 77e(a)(1) (1988).
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§ 3(a)(11) of the same act, sales of securities that would in all re-
spects otherwise qualify for inclusion within the requirements (or
prohibitions) of § 5 need not be registered if they are "offered and
sold only to persons resident within a single State or Territory,
where the issuer of such security is a person resident and doing
business within or, if a corporation, incorporated by and doing bus-
iness within, such State or Territory."'10 When a pair of legal rules
operates in the way that §§ 5 and 3(a)(11) do, we say that the lat-
ter constitutes an exception to the former."'
Now imagine a different exception to the registration require-
ments of the Securities Act of 1933. Suppose that, in addition to
the, exemption for intrastate sales of securities, we were to find
that the Act contained an exemption for sales of lawnmowers, both
interstate and intrastate. Were that the case, we would think the
statutory structure bizarre, in a way that we do not think the ex-
isting intrastate exemption bizarre, because the sale of
lawnmowers, unlike the intrastate sale of securities, is not a sub-
class of the class of sales of securities.
The very definition of an exception, therefore, presupposes
that what is excepted is otherwise within the scope of the broader
rule. Because intrastate sales are within the scope of "sales of se-
curities," the intrastate exemption makes sense. The "exception"
for lawnmower sales, on the other hand, is superfluous, or redun-
dant, because the registration requirements of the Act already ex-
clude lawnmower sales in the definition of the original scope-
designating term, "sale of any security."' 2 Only where the primary
designation of the scope of a legal rule includes rather than ex-
cludes some item that its creators wish not to include is it neces-
sary to add an exception.
We can now see how the necessity of an exception (or lack
thereof) to some legal rule is largely a function of the array of lin-
guistic tools then available to the drafter of the rule. Where the
language in which the rule is written contains a word or a familiar
phrase that itself excludes what the drafters wish to exclude from
the scope of the rule, no exception is necessary. All that is required
is to employ the appropriate word or phrase, and that which is to
be excluded is excluded without the necessity of an exception. But
15 USC § 77c(a)(11) (1988).
In this context, the exception is commonly referred to as the intrastate "exemption,"
but nothing in this Article turns on any difference between an exception and an exemption.
12 The immediately preceding language is a slight modification of the exact statutory
term, but the modification serves only stylistic purposes.
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where language does not provide any word or phrase, the scope of
some primary prescription or proscription will be defined in terms
that are likely to be overinclusive, from the perspective of the goals
of the legal rule. In order to tailor the rule to the legal goals, it
then becomes necessary to create an exception.13 Thus, if the En-
glish language contained a word-say, "intersale"-to designate
sales that were interstate but not intrastate in the § 3(a)(11) sense,
then we might have expected to see the primary prohibition in § 5
of the Securities Act couched simply in terms of a prohibition on
the "intersale" of unregistered securities, with no exemption for in-
trastate sales then being necessary.1 4
II. WHEN THE RIGHT WORDS CAN BE FOUND
The lesson that emerges is that the need for an exception is
frequently not at all a matter of substance. Rather, exceptions
often exist as a product of what is essentially a linguistic fortuity,
the way in which a language may or may not happen to contain
terms-such as "intersale"-excluding from coverage that which
the regulatory apparatus seeks to exclude. Exceptions can be the
product of linguistic circumstance, of the existing linguistic and
categorial structure of society that precedes the use or non-use of
an exception.
My claim that exceptions "often" result from linguistic fortu-
ity is somewhat inaccurate. In fact exceptions always result from
13 I assume here that nothing turns on the grammatical-statutory structure within
which the exception is placed. That is, I assume there is no difference between an exception
that reads, "Public sales of securities other than intrastate sales must be registered," and
one in which one discrete section states the general rule and a subsequent section carves out
an exception. The difference would be of greater moment if allocation of the burden of proof
turned on the form of designation. It might be, for example, that placement of the exception
within the original proscription would have the effect of placing the burden of proving the
non-applicability of the exception on the state or on the plaintiff, but that placing it sepa-
rately and subsequently would convert it into an affirmative defense. At times that place-
ment may have constitutional ramifications. See, for example, Martin v Ohio, 480 US 228
(1987); Patterson v New York, 432 US 197 (1977); Mullaney v Wilbur, 421 US 684 (1975);
Ronald J. Allen, Structuring Jury Decisionmaking in Criminal Cases: A Unified Constitu-
tional Approach to Evidentiary Devices, 94 Harv L Rev 321 (1980); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr.
and Paul B. Stephan, III, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal
Law, 88 Yale L J 1325 (1979); Charles R. Nesson, Rationality, Presumptions, and Judicial
Comment: A Response to Professor Allen, 94 Harv L Rev 1574 (1981).
" Anyone familiar with the operation of § 5 and its accompanying definitions and ex-
ceptions would justifiably question my assumption that the drafters would have chosen the
most linguistically or grammatically efficient course. Among the many cases on the excep-
tions to the exemptions from § 5, see, for example, McDaniel v Compania Minera Mar de
Cortes, 528 F Supp 152 (D Ariz 1981); Pawgan v Silverstein, 265 F Supp 898 (S D NY
1967).
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linguistic fortuity, but putting it in just that way is misleading be-
cause some seeming fortuities are explained by an available array
of linguistic tools that is itself far from fortuitous. Rather, the for-
tuity of the existence of the appropriate term in a language will
often reflect the categories and distinctions the language has previ-
ously found it necessary to employ. The way in which the preexist-
ing language sometimes requires an exception and sometimes not
thus tells us interesting things about the relation between legal
rules and the language in which they are written.
In order to pursue this issue, let me step back to explore the
relevance of the commonplace philosophical distinction between
regulative and constitutive rules. According to the distinction,
drawn by H.L.A. Hart,15 John Rawls, 16 and Max Black, 17 but most
commonly associated with John Searle,"8 certain rules regulate
conduct defined without reference to that rule. "No killing" or "No
driving in excess of 55 miles per hour" are good examples, because
the activities of both killing and driving in excess of 55 miles per
hour can exist and be described independent of any rule prohibit-
ing them. In these cases, the description of the activity is one
thing, and the regulatory posture toward that activity is something
quite different.
Other rules, by contrast, do not regulate logically antecedent
behavior, but create the very possibility of engaging in conduct of a
certain kind. Such constitutive rules define activities that could
not, absent the rule, even exist, or at least could not be described
in those terms. The rules of games are archetypal, since rules cre-
ate the very possibility of winning a trick, or scoring a touchdown,
or hitting a home run, or castling. Without the rules of chess you
cannot castle at all; without the traffic laws you can very well drive
in excess of 55 miles per hour (although you cannot speed).19
1" Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, in Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence
and Philosophy 21 (cited in note 7).
1" John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 Phil Rev 3, 19-29 (1955).
'7 Max Black, The Analysis of Rules, in Max Black, Models and Metaphors: Studies in
Language and Philosophy 95 (Cornell, 1962).
18 John Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language 33-42 (Cam-
bridge, 1969).
" The distinction between regulative and constitutive rules is not totally un-
problematic, see Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms 108-13 (Hutchinson, 1975), be-
cause there is a real question whether the distinction is one between different kinds of rules
or rather just one between different ways of describing acts. Still, even the latter version is
sufficient for my purposes here; my point turns only on a distinction none deny-between
those descriptions that presuppose the existence of comparatively discrete norm systems
and those that do not.
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The idea of a constitutive rule is closely connected to the way
in which legal rules or doctrinal tests sometimes employ technical
language, often referred to as "terms of art." Here it is useful to
identify two forms of technical language. One form consists of the
technical term with no ordinary language meaning, such as quark,
isotope, habeas corpus, or assumpsit. Another form consists of
terms with both ordinary and technical meanings, such as "solid"
to the physicist, "slice" to the golfer, or "contract" or "party" to
the lawyer.20 But whether the term has an ordinary meaning or
not, we would normally expect the technical term to incorporate
within its meaning those doctrinal nuances that determine the cov-
erage of the term.2
In other words, we would ordinarily expect exceptions to be
built into the meaning of a primary technical term. Because foul
balls are not home runs in the first place, it is odd to say that foul
balls are exceptions to the rule defining home runs. Similarly, we
do not normally say that contracts are enforced except those not
involving a meeting of the minds, or those not made with consider-
ation, because such arrangements are not contracts at all. The an-
swer to the question, "What is a corporation?" is much of (all of?.)
the law of corporations, including all the exceptions built into the
concept itself.22
2 Or "speech" to the constitutionalist? Compare Frederick Schauer, Rules, the Rule of
Law, and the Constitution, 6 Const Comm 69 (1989); Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S
Cal L Rev 399 (1985); and Frederick Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional Language, 29
UCLA L Rev 797 (1982), with Frederick Schauer, Speech and "Speech"-Obscenity and
"Obscenity": An Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 Georgetown
L J 899 (1979). In defense of my own inconsistency in at times stressing technical meaning
and at other times emphasizing ordinary language, I should note that the question of the
relationship between technical and ordinary language, a question of recurring importance, is
quite difficult, although it has received surprisingly little attention in the literature. A note-
worthy exception is Charles E. Caton, Introduction, in Charles E. Caton, ed, Philosophy
and Ordinary Language v (Illinois, 1963).
21 The interesting exception is where one part of the law, for its own purposes, uses
terms found in other parts of the law having different purposes. In such cases, we best think
of the two meanings as separate, and the meaning from the "other part of the law" as being
equivalent for these purposes to ordinary language or at least pre-legal meaning. Consider in
this connection Ploof v Putnam, 81 Vt 471, 71 A 188 (1908), in which the Supreme Court of
Vermont held in essence that the ordinary rule against trespass contained a necessity excep-
tion. Had the court been starting anew, unconstrained by any definitions existing either in
English or in legal understandings, it could have defined "trespass" in such a way that nec-
essary dockings simply fell outside the coverage of the trespass rule. The fact that it did not
do so is strong evidence of the entrenchment of the existing definition of trespass, such that
stipulative redefinition was impossible, and appending an exception consequently necessary.
2' See Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, in Hart, Essays in Jurispru-
dence and Philosophy 21 (cited in note 7).
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Thus, were law written entirely in constitutive terms of art, we
would expect to see few exceptions; the stipulative definition of
those terms would most likely build in those exclusions that we
would otherwise see in the form of exceptions. But because law is
written substantially in English rather than in Lawish, and is
partly beholden to ordinary understandings of language, all legal
terms are not (nor could they be) constitutive terms of art. A legal
rule regulating conduct defined in terms antecedent to that regula-
tory scheme is thus at the mercy of those antecedent terms. Just as
the term "sale" draws no distinction between interstate and intra-
state sales, many terms existing antecedent to their legal manifes-
tation fail to draw the distinctions or create the exceptions that
track the goal of some regulatory scheme. On occasion some ante-
cedent terms already exclude that which the drafters of the legal
rule wish to exclude, as with the exclusion of lawnmowers from the
class of securities, and then it is unlikely that the rule need be
crafted so as to incorporate an exception. But should the antece-
dent terms not exclude that which the drafters wish to exclude, as
with intrastate sales of securities, then an exception will be neces-
sary. The existence of an exception will therefore be a function not
so much of total linguistic fortuity, but rather of the way in which
legal goals intersect with the linguistic products and manifesta-
tions of the extra-legal and pre-legal human categorization that
provides much of the foundation on which legal regulation is
erected.
A good example of this phenomenon is the traditional legal
prohibition of fornication. Fornication is defined in Webster's
Third New International Dictionary as "sexual intercourse other
than between a man and his wife."'23 Thus, a statutory or common
law prohibition on fornication excludes sexual intercourse between
married persons without the necessity of a separate exception.2 4
Were the word "fornication" absent from the language, however, or
were the category of "sexual intercourse other than between mar-
ried persons" absent from the antecedent conceptual apparatus of
the society, then we would expect to see the same prohibition
couched in terms of a primary prohibition on sexual intercourse
with an accompanying exception for sexual intercourse between
married persons.
" The sole purpose of this footnote is to distance myself from the sexist way in which
Webster's defines the act.
214 See, for example, State v Sharp, 75 NJ L 201, 66 A 926, 927 (1907), State v Dana, 59
Vt 614, 10 A 727, 731 (1887).
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The relationship between law and the antecedent linguistic
and categorial apparatus in which and with which law is written
can tell us something about the various goals of legal regulation. At
times legal regulation seeks to change the social landscape. Not
only Prohibition but also more modern statutory regulation with
respect to discrimination, consumer protection, workplace safety,
the environment, and the preservation of endangered species are
examples of law pressing against existing social practices. Insofar
as such practices are likely to have their linguistic manifestation,
that is, insofar as a distinction or category recognized by social
practice will also be recognized by that society's language (and
here the Inuit's numerous words for different types of snow is the
classic if hackneyed example), then laws designed to move society
rather than reflect it will often encounter (and I make no more
than this probabilistic claim) the absence of any preexisting lan-
guage with which easily to do so. When that is the case, we can
expect to see exceptions and related linguistic devices used to draw
the distinctions not currently recognized by the language in which
the law is written.
By contrast, law sometimes seeks only to reinforce social prac-
tices or norms against the possibility of individual deviation or
widespread shift. Consider in this regard those laws prohibiting ac-
tivities that few of us would contemplate even absent legal regula-
tion, such as child molestation, indecent exposure, and cannibal-
ism. 25 Where laws serve this reinforcing function, as with the
traditional conception of the fornication laws, the linguistic and
categorical apparatus is likely already to be in place, and it is then
more probable that the scope of a legal rule will track the scope of
a social category, making the exception device less likely to be nec-
essary.26 It is just because the goal of fornication laws was to rein-
force an existing social distinction that those laws were able to find
a seemingly exceptionless word that drew just the distinction that
the drafters wished to draw.
Moreover, when a regulatory scheme tracks existing social
practices, the drafters may be more confident that widespread
agreement will be sufficient to allow interpreters to locate approxi-
15 Of course, the very fact that the activities are prohibited says something about the
drafters' perception of possible behavior. It is not without interest that in Massachusetts,
but in few other states, large signs prohibit drivers who have missed their exit from backing
up on a divided interstate highway.
"' I do not deny the possibility of a causal relation between the two categories, such
that social aversions to public nudity or eating fellow human beings are partly or even
largely a function of a social conditioning that itself employs legal or other norms.
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mately the same range of implicit exceptions, and explicit ones will
be less necessary. The presence of an explicit exception, therefore,
is once again a signal that the law is operating less to reflect and
reinforce existing practice than to attempt to modify it.
III. EXCEPTIONS AND THE RHETORIC OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Both the Securities Act of 1933 and the statutory prohibitions
on fornication involve specific statutes written in canonical lan-
guage. Often, however, exceptions arise not in the context of ca-
nonically inscribed rules, but rather with respect to common law or
constitutional rules. Such rules do not have a canonical inscription
in the strict sense, yet it is still often the case that certain under-
standings of those rules become so crystallized or entrenched that
those widely shared understandings operate in much the same way
as canonically inscribed rules. As a result, much about the contin-
gent relationship of rules and exceptions with respect to statutory
rules applies outside the statutory context as well. In order to see
this, let us look now at claims about exceptions in a wide variety of
First Amendment debates. We can start with flag burning, and
consider not only the Supreme Court decision in Texas v John-
son,2 7 but also the surrounding political/legal/constitutional con-
troversy. This controversy largely revolved around the appropriate-
ness of creating an "exception" either to "the First Amendment"
(the alleged danger of which turned out to carry great rhetorical
force in debates about the wisdom of amending the Constitution to
reverse the rulings in Johnson and United States v Eichman2s) or
to the principle, now well-established in the doctrine, that all view-
point-based restrictions on the expression of political opinions in
the public forum are unconstitutional. 9
Now that we have explored the logic of exceptions, we can see
that a great deal of the debate was not so much about the idea of
an exception as it was about the appropriate definition of the rele-
vant principle. Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Johnson was
premised on the belief that Johnson's "political expression was re-
stricted because of the content of the message he conveyed, '3' and
27 491 US 397 (1989) (striking down state flag desecration statute under the First
Amendment).
28 110 S Ct 2404 (1990) (invalidating federal statute purporting to reverse Johnson).
29 See, for example, Boos v Barry, 485 US 312, 321-22 (1988); American Booksellers
Ass'n, Inc. v Hudnut, 771 F2d 323 (7th Cir 1985), aff'd without opinion, 475 US 1001 (1986);
Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wm & Mary L Rev
189 (1983).
30 491 US at 412.
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that "[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amend-
ment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of
an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or dis-
agreeable." 1 The relevant principle for Justice Brennan, analogous
here to the initial specification of coverage in § 5 of the Securities
Act of 1933 or to the existing definition of the practice of fornica-
tion, is thus that (my words, not his) "all political communication
in the public forum is protected against viewpoint-based restric-
tions on either the content or the style of the communication."
With that as the initial specification of the principle, it is no sur-
prise that Justice Brennan would see Texas's arguments in John-
son as pleas for an exception to that principle. Twice he makes the
argument in exactly this form: "We have not recognized an excep-
tion to this principle even where our flag has been involved. 3 2
"There is, moreover, no indication-either in the text of the Con-
stitution or in our cases interpreting it-that a separate juridical
category exists for the American flag alone .... We decline, there-
fore, to create for the flag an exception to the joust of principles
protected by the First Amendment." 3 For Justice Brennan, the
proponents of restrictions were seeking exceptions to an intrinsi-
cally exceptionless principle.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, by contrast, can now be seen as argu-
ing that the relevant principle is that (my words) "all political
communication in the public forum other than flag desecration is
protected against viewpoint-based restrictions on either the con-
tent or the style of the communication." He wrote:
For more than 200 years, the American flag has occupied a
unique position as the symbol of our Nation, a uniqueness
that justifies a governmental prohibition against flag burning.
[The flag] does not represent the views of any particular polit-
ical party, and it does not represent any particular political
philosophy. The flag is not simply another 'idea' or 'point of
view' competing for recognition in the marketplace of ideas.
The Court decides that the American flag is just another sym-
bol, about which not only must opinions pro and con be toler-
31 Id at 414.
" Id.
33 Id at 417, 418.
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ated, but for which the most minimal public respect may not
be enjoined.3 4
Thus, it is plain that Justice Brennan was saying that the rele-
vant category is "political communication" and Chief Justice
Rehnquist was saying that it is "political communication other
than flag desecration." Although it is true that there is no single
word for "political communication other than flag desecration,"
one way of seeing the Chief Justice's liberal use in his dissent of
American history and patriotic poetry is as an attempt to support
the argument that the category "political communication other
than flag desecration" is an existing category in this culture. He is
claiming that running through the history of the founding of the
country, its battles to protect (and expand) its territory, and the
songs and poetry that reflect this history is a consistent
theme-that the flag and its preservation simply represent a cate-
gory of understanding in this culture different from and lying
outside any other category, including the category of political com-
munication. Consequently, to the Chief Justice the pertinent and
existing social category is not "political communication" but rather
"political communication other than flag desecration."
The relevance of the Chief Justice's argument that "political
communication other than flag desecration" is an existing category
is that it can be seen as an attempt to rebut the claim that the
dissent was in some way being ad hoc or unprincipled about its
willingness to treat the flag as different or special. If we had a word
for "political communication other than flag desecra-
tion"-"polation," for example-then the dissent might have said
that the basic principle is that "polation is protected against view-
point-based restrictions on either the content or the style of the
communication," and that the majority was attempting to engraft
ad hoc or unprincipled additions to that basic principle. Indeed,
the Chief Justice specifically characterizes the majority's conclu-
sions as an "extension of constitutional protection to the burning
of the flag."'3 5 Implicit in this language is the view that "polation
plus flag desecration" is no intrinsically neater than "political com-
munication minus flag desecration."3 6
-I Id at 422, 429, 435.
35 Id at 435.
86 See Richard Delgado, Campus Anti-Racism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Col-
lision, 85 Nw U L Rev 343, 345-48 (1991) (arguing in the context of sanctions on racist and
therefore equality-denying speech that the current view of the First Amendment as limiting
the principle of equality is no more inherently valid than a different view pursuant to which
equality would limit the principle of freedom of speech).
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So we now see that part of what transpired in Johnson was a
potentially confusing rhetorical battle, with both sides claiming the
high ground of the internally sound principle, and accusing the
other of the aberrational attempt to pollute that principle. And we
can see as well, from our beginnings with the Securities Act of
1933, that the battle was largely just rhetorical, for there is noth-
ing more natural or intrinsically sound as a logical matter about
Justice Brennan's category of political communication than there
is about Chief Justice Rehnquist's of political communication
other than flag desecration.3 7
But is the logical equivalence between the two arguments suf-
ficient? What are we to make of the fact that "polation" is not a
word in the language, and of the fact that there appears to be no
existing simple phrase for "political communication other than flag
desecration" other than "political communication other than flag
desecration"? One answer would be that the lack of a single word
or simpler phrase is indicative of a lack of a principled distinction
between political communication via flag desecration and political
communication using other methods, at least if we assume that
those other methods might include harsh criticism of government
by use of a method that offends many unwilling listeners or view-
ers.38 Presupposed in this answer is the claim that there is a rela-
tionship between the intrinsic plausibility of a distinction and its
existing economical embodiment in the language. Where we must
resort to language as cumbersome as "political communication
other than flag desecration," it might be said, we have good evi-
dence that there is something unsound about the principle.
This position appears to evaluate the soundness of a principle
according to the existence of an easy and brief way to characterize
or reflect it. Yet surely the very enterprises of argument, analysis,
and careful thought presuppose that we might be able to draw dis-
tinctions whose soundness is not undercut by the unavailability of
a word or short phrase to reflect them. Were the existence of a
single word or simple phrase dispositive, the absence of such a
word or phrase would end discussion. But it does not, and that is
37 Indeed, although I focus on a debate that took place in a judicial decision, the rhetor-
ical force of exceptions language is far more prevalent outside of judicial opinions, and
plainly, as the ensuing flag desecration debate demonstrated, much that I argue here about
the distorting nature of "exceptions" rhetoric is far more applicable to public than to judi-
cial debate.
38 See, for example, Cohen v California, 403 US 15 (1971) (wearing of jacket embla-
zoned with "Fuck the Draft" in corridor of county courthouse protected by First
Amendment).
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why the names we give principles, names like the principle of
equality or Rawls' Difference Principle, are only names, telling us
virtually nothing about the actual contours of the principles. 9 Ac-
cordingly, the lack of a culturally assimilated simpler phrase for
"political communication other than flag desecration" is at best
weak evidence of the inability to draw a sound distinction de-
scribed by the more cumbersome phrase, although it might be
quite good evidence of whether some culture has already drawn it.
This does not mean, of course, that all distinctions are sound.
I have claimed only that the non-existence of a single word or
short phrase reflecting an articulable distinction is at best little ev-
idence of the soundness of the distinction. But to articulate a dis-
tinction or to make an argument is not to prove the soundness of
the distinction or the tenability of the argument. In fact, for rea-
sons not germane here, I am not persuaded that the distinction
drawn by Chief Justice Rehnquist is normatively sound, given the
language and underlying purposes of the First Amendment. Never-
theless, let us suppose that the dissent in Johnson can support a
distinction. Let us suppose that, given such factors as the historical
place of the flag, the degree of offense and hurt involved (and there
is of course nothing unprincipled about drawing a distinction
based on differences of degree40), and the importance of a unifying
national symbol, there is a plausible argument that the flag is dif-
ferent for First Amendment purposes. 41 If this argument for the
distinctiveness of the flag were taken to be sound, then the fact of
the socially extant linguistic and categorial apparatus becomes rel-
evant in a different way. For now Justice Brennan might be saying
something quite different. Conceding for the sake of argument the
theoretical tenability of the flag/no flag distinction, he could be
read as arguing that the lack of a social consensus as to the distinc-
tiveness of the flag, however unfortunate that lack of a social con-
sensus might be, is indicative of the likely fragility of the "political
communication other than flag desecration" category.42 Were there
'" This is why we often use the words "concept" or "idea" to mark the fact that some
word, like "law," is but the name of something far more complex. Consider why "the con-
cept of law" or "the concept of equality" or "the concept of justice" do not sound as odd as
"the concept of penguin" or "the concept of subway."
o See Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 Harv L Rev 361 (1989).
41 For an example of such an argument, see Douglas W. Kmiec, In the Aftermath of
Johnson and Eichman: The Constitution Need Not be Mutilated to Preserve the Govern-
ment's Speech and Property Interests in the Flag, 1990 BYU L Rev 577, 587-91 (1990).
42 Although Justice Brennan did not make this argument in this form in Johnson, there
is a close parallel between my interpretation of what Justice Brennan might have said in a
different Johnson and what he did say in Paris Adult Theatre I v Slaton, 413 US 49, 82
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an entrenched term for that category, then our fears of further ex-
ceptions would have less basis. And, even without an entrenched
term, were the distinction itself socially entrenched, then the social
acceptance of the distinction would cast doubt on the fear that ex-
ceptions to "political communication other than flag desecration"
would be just around the corner. And in response to this argument
from the fragility in practice of a distinction that was sound in
theory, the dissent could then be seen as attempting to demon-
strate with its poetry and its history the in-place social entrench-
ment that provides the answer to the majority's fears. Although
there is no one word for the category the Chief Justice seeks to
defend, to him there exists a socially entrenched idea, much like
"fornication," within which the relevant exception is already
incorporated.
Curiously, therefore, it is the so-called "conservative" dissent
in Johnson that is being theoretically modernist, in the sense of
relying on a perspective recognizing the social, cultural, and histor-
ical roots of our categories, and the consequent contingency of any
society's categorial understandings.43 It is, intriguingly, the dissent
that wishes to resist the idea that there is something natural or
neutral about the category "political speech," and about its intrin-
sic or logical priority over the category "political communication
other than flag burning." To the dissent, but arguably not to the
majority, the relevant categories are not rigid or abstract or natu-
ral, but must be examined in light of historical practices and cur-
rent understandings."
(1973) (Brennan dissenting). In arguing that the obscenity laws were unconstitutional, Jus-
tice Brennan did not reject the principle of obscenity as "non-speech" that he had set forth
in 1957 in Roth v United States, 354 US 476 (1957). He maintained that the principle had
proved unworkable in practice, a function of the inability of some sound distinctions to be
interpreted as such by those charged with applying them. See Schauer, 99 Harv L Rev at
373-83 (cited in note 40).
"' What I call modernist, see also David Luban, Legal Modernism, 84 Mich L Rev 1656
(1986), others might call post-modernist, but nothing here turns on that distinction, which
in any event varies among disciplines (post-modernist architecture, for example, is charac-
terized by its incorporation of traditional forms within contemporary design). All I maintain
is that a range of perspectives stressing categorial malleability and categorial contingency is
more evident in the dissent, and that a range of perspectives stressing the fixity and natural
necessity of social categories is more evident in Justice Brennan's majority opinion.
" I put the issue in this way not (only) to be tendentious, but to suggest what I have
recently urged at some length, that the idea of the categorial protection of freedom of
speech is itself, to the core, dependent upon a rule-based and "formalistic" understanding of
the relevance of the category "speech." See Frederick Schauer, The Second-Best First
Amendment, 31 Wm & Mary L Rev 1 (1989).
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Chief Justice Rehnquist may be historically inaccurate in his
claim about the place of the flag in American history or in his as-
sessment of the categorial import of that history. And even if he is
historically correct, that category may be normatively undesirable,
in the same way that many other existing distinctions are norma-
tively undesirable. Yet implicit in the Chief Justice's historical and
cultural analysis is a recognition of the way in which the categories
of the law, including the categories of the First Amendment, are
not natural and fixed but are reflective of the kinds of distinctions
that a society has drawn and is capable of defending. Insofar as it
is "conservative" to urge the (at least presumptive) workability of
socially extant categories, then explaining the historical pedigree of
the "political communication other than flag desecration" category
is part of an argument for taking that category as a given." But
insofar as it is "conservative" to take existing phrases such as "po-
litical speech" as more natural and unchangeable than contingent
and movable, then it is the majority rather than the dissent that
seems conservative.
We now see that, given the ability to draw a theoretical dis-
tinction, any doctrinal rule reflecting that distinction would have
to be considered principled, for there is nothing to the idea of a
principled decision other than the willingness to adhere to the pre-
viously drawn distinction." Some distinctions, however, will build
on and employ a culture's existing linguistic and categorial struc-
ture, and in such cases we have reason to suppose that the distinc-
tion will resist efforts to defeat it. Others, however, will challenge
rather than build on the society's in-place linguistic and categorial
.apparatus, and in those cases there is cause for less confidence that
the distinction will have the strength necessary to resist efforts to
destroy it.
IV. THE CONTINGENCY OF FIRST AMENDMENT CATEGORIES: RACIAL
HATRED AND PORNOGRAPHY
Consider in this regard the contrast between the Skokie deci-
sions in this country47 and the existence of anti-Nazi legislation
'5 See Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 Yale L J 1029, 1047-68
(1990).
46 See Kent Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 Colum L
Rev 982 (1978); M.P. Golding, Principled Decision-Making and the Supreme Court, 63
Colum L Rev 35, 40-42 (1963).
4' Collin v Smith, 578 F2d 1197 (7th Cir), stay denied, 436 US 953, cert denied, 439 US
916 (1978); National Socialist Party of America v Village of Skokie, 434 US 1327 (1977)
(Stevens denying stay); National Socialist Party of America v Village of Skokie, 432 US 43
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and governmental practice in Germany. A recent German law,
aimed at those who would deny the existence of the Holocaust,
permits prosecution for insult "if the insulted person was perse-
cuted as a member of a group under the National Socialist or an-
other violent or arbitrary dominance. '48 Other laws, also commonly
understood to be aimed primarily at Nazis, and enforced primarily
against neo-Nazis, prohibit incitement to hatred against segments
of the population and prohibit the instigation of race hatred.49 And
in 1986 the Administrative Court of Braunschweig upheld revoca-
tion of a doctorate on the sole grounds that the recipient, a former
judge, had subsequently written a book questioning whether six
million Jews had died in the Holocaust."
Implicit in the German racial hatred laws is thus a constitu-
tionally permissible intention to deal specially and specifically with
Nazi speech, and to restrict inciters of racial hatred although not
other offensive or harmful speakers. In this regard the German law
plainly diverges from the American, as the Skokie cases make
clear. But one way of explaining why both may be correct (even
assuming otherwise equivalent understandings of and commit-
ments to freedom of speech) is in terms of the divergent exper-
iences of the two countries with respect to the relevant category.5 1
Part of most arguments for restricting Nazi speech is the supposi-
tion that there exist principled categories (and again remember
that arguments from differences in degree can still be principled")
such as "offensive political communication other than by Nazis" or
(1977) (per curiam). See generally David Goldberger, Skokie: The First Amendment Under
Attack By Its Friends, 29 Mercer L Rev 761 (1978).
48 Eric Stein, History Against Free Speech: The New German Law Against the "Au-
schwitz"--And Other-"Lies", 85 Mich L Rev 277, 323 (1986) (quoting the West German
Criminal Code, Art 194, 1985 BGB1 965).
" Id at 322-23. See also Donald P. Kommers, The Jurisprudence of Free Speech in the
United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, 53 S Cal L Rev 657 (1980).
50 Stein, 85 Mich L Rev at 280 & n 11 (cited in note 48).
51 It is possible that the German tolerance for a Nazi or racial hatred exception simply
reflects a constitutional document more tolerant of exceptions generally, for the German
Basic Law, just like Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, explicitly
allows for exceptions to the principle of freedom of speech. See generally Ulrich Karpen,
Freedom of Expression, in Ulrich Karpen, ed, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Germany: Essays on the Basic Rights and Principles of the Basic Law with a Translation
of the Basic Law 97 (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1988). Still, there seems no basis for sup-
posing that the resultant doctrinal structure is in general more complex or exception-laden
in Germany than in the United States, although in the United States that structure comes
only from the case law and not from the text. See generally Frederick Schauer, Codifying
the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 S Ct Rev 285. As a result, the difference
seems explainable more by cultural differences in viewing the Nazi experience than by dif-
ferent broad-based constitutional methodologies.
5' See Schauer, 99 Harv L Rev 361 (cited in note 40).
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"offensive political communication other than that involving racial
hatred." Where such categories exist, free speech protection for the
communications falling within them can theoretically as well as
practically coexist with restrictions on the speech lying outside
them.
When arguments in this form are made in this country they
are commonly rejected, as is implicit in the Skokie decisions, in
part because this country and its legal/constitutional culture have
arguably not seen Nazis as dramatically different from other mor-
ally reprehensible and offensive groups, of which the Ku Klux
Klan and those who would urge the physical degradation of women
are perhaps the most obvious examples. In this country Nazis are
less sui generis, and are instead part of a larger category, or at
least less distinct from other members of a potentially larger class.
Consequently, the First Amendment operates against the back-
ground of an antecedent linguistic and categorial structure in
which an "exception" for Nazis would amount to a legal confronta-
tion with the society's underlying conceptual apparatus, a confron-
tation that might cause us to predict the possibility that accept-
ance of the "offensive political communication other than by
Nazis" category would lead to the creation of other exceptions.
Compare, however, the likely understanding of the same cate-
gory within Germany. In light of the history of that country, and in
light of the continuing effect of the Nazi experience on that soci-
ety's self-understanding, the existence of a durable and entrenched
distinction between Nazis and all other groups (or, more precisely,
between inciters of racial hatred and other harmful and offensive
speakers), no matter how offensive, harmful, and reprehensible
those other groups may be, seems much more plausible."3 And if
that is the case, then it is possible that the categories "offensive
political communication other than by Nazis" or "political commu-
nications other than those urging racial hatred" are already well-
established categories in Germany even if they are not here.
Should that be so, then a range of (contingently) valid-in-this-
country arguments about the potential future implications of an
51 Implicit in the foregoing argument is the claim that neither this country's war with
Nazi Germany nor its legacy of slavery has, as a matter of social fact, influenced the self-
understanding and national identity of the 1991 United States in the way that Germany's
Nazi past has influenced the self-understanding of the 1991 Germany. My claim here is
descriptive rather than normative, attempting only to explain the prevalence of "dangerous
precedent" and "slippery slope" arguments that are made in the United States when restric-
tions on Nazi or racist speech are urged, but which are not made when such restrictions are
urged, enacted, and enforced in Germany.
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"offensive political communication other than by Nazis" category
would be far less valid in Germany.
Indeed, the divergence between the two countries may be ex-
plained simply by a difference between what counts as "political."
Decisions in this country relating to Nazis and other inciters of
racial hatred are premised on the inclusion of such groups within
the category of the political. Their exclusion would consequently
represent an exception to an otherwise inclusive category of politi-
cal speech, with the accompanying concerns about the possibility
of further exceptions. But if it is the case that in some societies the
very concept or category of "political" already excludes those who
would incite racial hatred or who would overthrow the constitu-
tional order,54 and that the ideas of "political speech by Nazis" or
"political speech urging racial hatred" are internally contradictory,
then even a principle prohibiting content-based discrimination
against political advocacy would not cover the communications of
those whose advocacy of genocide or racial hatred would simply
not count as "political" at all.
Even if it is correct that there now exists in this country
neither a well-entrenched definition of the political that internally
excludes urgings to racial hatred, nor a well-entrenched category of
"political speech other than that urging racial hatred," it is possi-
ble that some day there might be such distinctions, and it is possi-
ble to argue that such distinctions are defensible and ought to be
embodied in this society's linguistic and conceptual apparatus. In-
deed, this seems an illuminating way of understanding contempo-
rary arguments about anti-pornography regulation. The First
Amendment-based invalidation of the Indianapolis anti-pornogra-
phy ordinance embodied the view that the ordinance constituted a
viewpoint-based restriction, as to which there existed no doctrinal
basis for an exception. 5 I will concede the doctrinal plausibility of
that conclusion (which is not to deny the plausibility, perhaps even
the doctrinal plausibility, of the opposite conclusion 56), but we can
now appreciate that the non-existence of an exception to a prohibi-
54 On the exclusion of those who would overthrow the constitutional order from politi-
cal participation, see the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, Art 18 (forfeiture
of basic rights), translated in Gisbert H. Flanz, Federal Republic of Germany 49, in Albert
P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz, eds, 6 Constitutions of the Countries of the World (Oce-
ana, 1985).
55 Hudnut, 771 F2d at 328. The same argument undergirded the mayor's veto of a simi-
lar ordinance in Minneapolis in 1985, and the unreported invalidation of essentially the
same ordinance in Bellingham, Washington in 1989.
"6 See Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 Duke L J 589.
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tion on viewpoint-based restrictions and the non-existence of a cat-
egory of "viewpoints other than the viewpoint that women are ap-
propriate objects for sexual violence," as to which no exception
would be necessary, are neither natural nor neutral. They merely
reflect the contingent linguistic and categorial apparatus with
which we view these ordinances.
From this perspective, proponents of anti-pornography legisla-
tion can be seen to urge the recognition and entrenchment of the
"viewpoints other than.. ." category, the category that could form
the basis for a First Amendment principle that would be without
exceptions. Taken in the light most consistent with the existing
doctrinal structure of the First Amendment, those arguments
could still be viewed as acknowledgments that this category does
not now exist, but as attempts, structurally analogous to Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist's in Texas v Johnson, to create a world in which
this category did exist. In this case, the assimilation of the category
within the doctrinal structure of the First Amendment would cause
no worry about exceptions. The category would simply exclude
that lying without it, just as the category of sales of securities ex-
cludes the sale of lawnmowers. Once we recognize the oddness of
the very idea of an exception, we recognize as well the contingent
conditions under which an argument from the undesirability of ex-
ceptions has rhetorical and doctrinal appeal.
Thus, contemporary anti-pornography proposals can be seen
to ask three closely related questions: Why is the relevant juridical
category "viewpoints" rather than "viewpoints other than the
viewpoint that women are appropriate objects of sexual violence"?
Why does the category "viewpoint" include articulation of the po-
sition that women are appropriate objects of sexual violence? Fi-
nally, why does the category of "politics" or "political argument"
include those who would urge sexual violence against women? The
point is that the existing category, including sexual violence and
therefore necessitating a potentially fragile exception in order to
permit the restriction, is only contingent, and it is hardly incon-
ceivable that there could be a world in which the initial category
would exclude advocates of sexual violence just as there is a Nazi-
excluding category in Germany. From this perspective the pro-
posed anti-pornography legislation is more than just an attack on a
certain variety of communication. It is an attack on a conceptual
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structure that puts that communication in the same class with
communications of a dramatically different sort.57
V. THE FOUNDATIONS OF A CATEGORIAL STRUCTURE
Nothing in the foregoing denies the existence of natural kinds
like tigers and titanium. Context may be a lot, but it is not every-
thing. Although this is hardly the place for a discourse on meta-
physics, even were I qualified to give one, I want to grant the argu-
ments of metaphysical realists, who maintain that there are
natural kinds whose physical delineation precedes the act of
human categorization. Where the law operates on such natural
kinds, as when for example it prohibits killing bald eagles, it oper-
ates on a world in which the antecedent linguistic and categorial
structure frequently reflects the underlying physical reality of the
world. In such cases the linguistic and social categories upon which
the law operates are likely to be least contingent, and least likely
to change. As a result, the need for an exception will often be the
result not of linguistic or cultural fortuity, but of the natural ter-
rain upon which the law operates and by which it is constrained.
At the other extreme, law sometimes operates on categories
entirely of its own making, as we saw in the examination of consti-
tutive rules and technical terms. In such cases the presence or ab-
sence of an exception is likely to be a function either of mere sty-
listic felicity or of procedural concerns such as those involving
allocation of the burden of proof. Where law is the master of its
categorial underpinnings, it can work in a world in which little of
substance turns on whether a legal rule employs the logically
empty device of an exception.
In most cases, however, law operates between these extremes,
confronting and using antecedent social and linguistic categories
that are neither natural nor of the legal system's own making.
Then the distinction between what looks like a principle and what
looks like an exception is likely to be deceiving. The distinction is
now seen to be contingent and not fixed, empirical and not inexo-
rable. To say this, of course, is not to commit the Realist and neo-
67 I believe that all I have said in this section applies to contemporary debates about
controls on racist speech on campus or in the public forum. Compare Charles R. Lawrence,
III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 Duke L J 431;
Marl J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87
Mich L Rev 2320 (1989); and Note, A First Amendment Justification for Regulating Racist
Speech on Campus, 40 Case W Res L Rev 733 (1989-90), with Robert C. Post, Racist
Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 Wm & Mary L Rev 267 (1991); and
Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 Duke L
J 484, 523-48.
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Realist fallacy of supposing that the social contingency of the cate-
gories with which law deals is strong or even much evidence of the
ability of legal actors to change them.58 But recognition of those
categorial contingencies enables us to see in a different light the
continuing interplay between legal and social change. At times,
more rarely than many suppose, legal change might produce social
change, and thus alter the categorial structure that reflects a soci-
ety's understandings.59 For example, the pervasiveness within
much of current social consciousness of the concept of sexual har-
assment owes its origins to a movement for legal reform. 0 More
commonly, legal change is parasitic on social change. That is why
it is possible to accept simultaneously the plausibility both of the
Skokie decisions and of the German anti-Nazi laws, even with an
assumption of otherwise identical free speech principles in the two
countries; why it is possible simultaneously to acknowledge the
doctrinal basis of the result in the pornography ordinance cases
while envisaging a world in which the opposite result would be
considered sound; and why we can see the opinions in Texas v
Johnson as reflecting not so much differing views about the First
Amendment as different understandings of the American experi-
ence. The use of an exception is a signal that the law and the soci-
ety on which it presses are not in harmony. Whether this is a good
or bad thing depends mostly on the particular substantive context,
but it is likely that those who employ or urge what is now seen to
be an exception are the ones who are urging change in the status
58 And this is why the "dangerous precedent" argument surrounding the Skokie cases
was a real argument. If law's ability to remake its categories were complete, then the con-
cern that an extra-legal world might fail to appreciate the distinction drawn by the courts
would be of no significance.
59 I do not deny the phenomenon. I do, however, question the suggestion (see Anders
Vilhelm Lundstedt, Legal Thinking Revised: My Views on Law (Almqvist & Wiksell, 1956);
Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 Stan L Rev 57 (1984)) that this is the preva-
lent direction of law/culture interaction or that culture is so law-soaked as to make the law/
culture distinction itself problematic. Although legal concepts and categories do often pro-
vide the conceptual apparatus with which people outside of the legal system think and talk
(see Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform,
96 Harv L Rev 1497 (1983)), the prevalence of that phenomenon is likely to be overesti-
mated by lawyers inclined to see the world through a legal lens, and to see the world in a
way that overstates the law's importance in it. (Nor are lawyers any different in this regard
from others, all of whom are likely to see a world in which they and those like them occupy
a more prominent place than would be seen by others differently situated.) Ultimately these
questions are empirical, and assessing the prevalence of a phenomenon that all acknowledge
(or should acknowledge) requires resort to empirical techniques all too rare in legal
scholarship.
80 See especially Catharine MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Women: A Case of Sex
Discrimination (Yale, 1979).
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quo, while those who argue against exceptions are those for whom
the society's existing linguistic and conceptual structure reflects
the world as they wish it to be.
VI. EXCEPTIONS AND THE FORCE OF RULES
Taking these cases together demonstrates that there is nothing
special or inexorable about the line between an exception and what
it is an exception to. In the First Amendment context, the lesson of
this is that arguments couched in the language of exceptions are
usefully viewed as arguments over competing conceptions of the
central principle itself. But if arguments about exceptions are in
reality arguments about the rule itself, then in many other con-
texts it is important to resist the idea that exceptions exist apart
from rules, and, consequently, that adding an exception is any-
thing other than changing the rule. The corollary of recognizing
that rule R, which internally excludes instance I, is no different
from rule R(1), which internally includes instance I but then con-
tains an exception for I, is that there is also no difference between
adding an exception I to rule R and changing rule R. Now that we
know that exceptions are continuous with the rules they are excep-
tions to, however contingent that continuity may be, we can see
that there is no difference between adding an exception to a rule
and simply changing it. Consequently, a significant benefit of un-
derstanding the logical emptiness of the idea of an exception as an
analytically distinct concept is that we can now understand the
power to create an exception in a much less epiphenomenal light.
A legal rule instantiates some background goal, purpose, or
justification. Thus "Speed Limit 55" and "No Vehicles in the
Park" might reflect the purpose of promoting safety (or conserving
fuel), "No Dogs Allowed" might reflect the background purpose of
preventing disturbance of the patrons in a restaurant, and the spe-
cific language of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
might further the purpose of preventing the filing of frivolous
pleadings. None of these rules contains an exception, but cases
might arise in which some form of conduct literally within the lan-
guage of the rule-formulation seems not to serve the rule's back-
ground purpose or justification, as with Fuller's statue of a vehicle
and the "No Vehicles in the Park" rule,61 or with a seeing-eye dog
and the "No Dogs Allowed" rule.
41 Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 Harv
L Rev 630, 663 (1958), responding to H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law
and Morals, 71 Harv L Rev 593, 607 (1958).
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The prevailing American view of such cases is that the literal
language of the rule should yield to the purpose, especially where
the language is overinclusive rather than underinclusive 2 Where
the literal language is overinclusive, a common view is that courts
(or other interpreters) should recognize exceptions where applica-
tion of the literal language would not serve the rule's purpose.6 3
What is going on here? Assuming the putative exception does
not already exist in the law, in which case nothing interesting is
going on at all, the interpreter is being asked to create an excep-
tion to a rule not literally already recognizing that exception, or to
recognize a supposedly immanent exception not previously explic-
itly recognized. But where is the normative purchase for the recog-
nition or creation (which may or may not be the same thing), for
saying that this exception is necessary and that one is not? Pre-
sumably it comes from consulting the rule's purpose, and the re-
cent American tradition can be described in terms of a principle
that would allow (or require) the interpreter to create or recognize
an exception to a literally exceptionless rule if not to do so would
yield a result inconsistent with the rule's purpose.
But if the ground for creating or recognizing an exception and
applying it to the very case that prompted creating it is that fail-
ure to do so would frustrate the rule's purpose, then applying the
rule and reserving the power to fashion an exception whenever ex-
ceptionless application would not serve the rule's purpose is exten-
sionally equivalent to simply applying the rule's purpose directly
to particular cases. If inconsistency with purpose is a sufficient
condition for modifying what was previously thought to be the rule
in the instant case, then no case will exist in which application of
the rule will differ from application of the purpose, and thus it is
the purpose rather than the rule-formulation that in fact is the
02 "Curing" an underinclusive rule by holding it applicable to a party not literally
within the rule's terms involves problems of notice and assertion of judicial authority that
are less serious with respect to curing an overinclusive rule by refusing to apply it. For
examples of refusal to cure literal underinclusiveness, see Pavelic & LeFlore v Marvel En-
tertainment Group, 110 S Ct 456 (1990) (refusing to extend FRCP Rule 11 liability to law
firms); McBoyle v United States, 283 US 25 (1931) (Holmes) (refusing to extend National
Motor Vehicle Theft Act to airplanes).
63 California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v Guerra, 479 US 272 (1987); Steelworkers
v Weber, 443 US 193, 200-08 (1979); Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal
Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law (Cambridge tent ed 1957);
William Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U Pa L Rev 1479, 1537-54
(1987); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv L Rev
405, 419-20 (1989).
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rule. 4 It thus turns out that in a quite different context the lan-
guage of exceptions is more misleading than helpful. There is
something seemingly benign about the ability to create exceptions,
for something about an exception looks comparatively trivial. But
if there is power to create exceptions in the name of purpose, and
to apply those exceptions immediately, then the exception-creating
power is identical to the power to apply the purpose rather than
the rule, or to take the purpose as in fact being the rule. Now this
too may be benign,65 but my point here is that little more than
deception is served by employing the language of exceptions. We
already have the linguistic tools to talk about the ability to apply
purpose directly to cases, and we already have the linguistic tools
to talk about the ability of judges to modify rules as they go along.
Given that in American legal culture neither of these is considered
anathema,6 6 little is served by the use of a term that suggests that
something else is transpiring.
The risk of confusion is even greater if the reason for creating
an exception is equity or justice rather than the single purpose be-
hind a single rule. 7 For if a rule will be applied only when it is
consistent with justice, then it turns out once again that talk of
exceptions, or of the power to create them, is largely distracting.
The power to create an exception to a rule when required by jus-
tice is equivalent to the power to do justice simpliciter. Again, to
describe the role of the courts in such terms is hardly abhorrent
these days,' but if that is so there is even less reason to disguise in
64 I am intentionally collapsing the distinction among creation, modification, and recog-
nition of the previously unrecognized, for the seemingly less intrusive practice of recognition
is no different from the seemingly more intrusive practices of creation or modification if
what is "recognized" has not been recognized before. None of this is to say that intrusive-
ness in this sense is necessarily or acontextually undesirable, but here again we may be
witnessing a conflict between the desire to promote interpretive authority and the desire to
mask its existence.
15 But sometimes not. See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 Yale L J 509, 538-44
(1988).
66 See generally Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 163-66
(Harvard, 1982); Donald C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process:
The Revisionist Role of the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 Mich L Rev 672
(1987); Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Construction in
the Supreme Court, 95 Harv L Rev 892, 912-15 (1982).
17 See generally Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Equity: An Analysis of Excep-
tions to Administrative Rules, 1982 Duke L J 277.
68 But see Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the
Law (Free Press, 1990); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U Chi L Rev
1175 (1989).
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the trivializing language of exceptions what is in reality a quite dif-
ferent mode of decisionmaking.
Consider in this light the following from H.L.A. Hart, as
quoted and endorsed by Judge Posner:
We promise to visit a friend the next day. When the day
comes it turns out that keeping the promise would involve
neglecting someone dangerously ill. The fact that this is ac-
cepted as an adequate reason for not keeping the promise
surely does not mean that there is no rule requiring promises
to be kept, only a certain regularity in keeping them. It does
not follow from the fact that such rules have exceptions inca-
pable of exhaustive statement, that in every situation we are
left to our discretion and are never bound to keep a promise.
A rule that ends with the word "unless . . ." is still a rule.69
Hart's claim, which at other times he characterizes in terms of
the defeasibility of a legal rule,70 is that legal rules are always sub-
ject to the addition of what Posner calls "ad hoc exceptions. 7 1 But
if the basis for creating or adding that ad hoc exception is the judi-
cial determination that it would be best, all things considered, to
add it, then the result again turns out to be extensionally
equivalent to a procedure pursuant to which the judge simply
makes the best all things considered decision directly.7 2
Yet this is exactly what Hart denies in claiming that ad hoc
exceptions can be added at the moment of application while still
not being "left to our discretion." Hart is able to make this claim,
however, because he confuses and conflates two distinct phenom-
ena-creating an exception to a rule and overriding a rule. The
phenomenon Hart describes, certainly common enough to the
American constitutionalist familiar with "compelling interests"
and "clear and present dangers," is that some rules or principles
are not absolute, but rather are capable of being overridden in par-
ticularly exigent circumstances. Just as racial classifications may
69 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 136 (Oxford, 1961), quoted in Richard A. Posner,
The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 Mich L Rev 827, 834-35 (1988).
7o H.L.A. Hart, The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, 49 Proc Aristotelian Soc
171, 175 (1949). See generally G.P. Baker, Defeasibility and Meaning, in P.M.S. Hacker and
J. Raz, eds, Law, Morality, and Society: Essays in Honour of H.L.A. Hart 26 (Clarendon,
1977).
71 Posner, 86 Mich L Rev at 834 (cited in note 69).
72 The point I make here is similar to David Lyons's argument that act- and rule-utili-
tarianism are extensionally equivalent as long as rules are allowed to be of unlimited speci-
ficity and continuous malleability. David Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism 115-18
(Oxford, 1965).
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be employed if they are held to serve a compelling interest,7 3 or
constitutionally covered speech may be restricted in order to pre-
vent the realization of a clear and present danger,74 so too might
the rule requiring the keeping of promises be overridden by the
force of the principle, as applied in some case, that one should at-
tend to those in distress.
Thus, the phenomenon that Hart describes is not that of the
continuously malleable rule subject to modification in the service
of the best judgment for the case at hand, all things considered,
nor that of the rule subject to the adding of exceptions whenever it
seems best (all things considered) to add them. Both of these
methodologies are indeed equivalent to the simple grant of discre-
tion that Hart wants to distinguish. Rather, Hart wants to capture
the way in which rules can be overridden in particularly exigent
circumstances and still be rules, even if it is impossible to predict
or to specify in advance what those exigent circumstances will be.
But what can and must be specified in advance to preserve the
ruleness of the rule is the very standard of exigency, or its
equivalent, for, if the reasons for overriding a rule need be no
greater than the reasons that support the rule, there will be no
case in which the existence of the rule makes a difference. If we
clarify Hart's point, therefore, we cast doubt on his whole notion of
defeasibility (as something different from overrideability). We can
still, however, maintain that unless the reasons for creating an ad
hoc exception are stronger than the mere divergence between rule
and purpose, or stronger than the mere existence of a better all
things considered decision if the exception is added, there is no
difference between the power to create an ad hoc exception and
the power to change the rule. Moreover, unless there exists this
divergence in the strength of the relevant reasons, there is no dif-
ference between the power to make an ad hoc change in a rule
based on X and the power to make decisions based on X. This, to
repeat, is not necessarily to be condemned, but little other than
deception seems served by describing the process in ways that oc-
1 See, for example, Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1, 11 (1967); Korematsu v United
States, 323 US 214, 216 (1944).
"I Schenck v United States, 249 US 47 (1919). On the distinction between coverage and
protection, a distinction that makes it possible to describe the way in which conduct may
simultaneously be within the scope of a right yet be properly restricted under exigent cir-
cumstances, see Frederick Schauer, Can Rights Be Abused?, 31 Phil Q 225 (1981); Frederick
Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 Vand L Rev 265
(1981).
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clude appreciating the central connection between issues of rule
change and issues of authority to make those changes.
CONCLUSION
The results of this analysis seem thus to trivialize the idea of
an exception, but this is not to trivialize exceptions. On the con-
trary, we can now see that in a number of seemingly quite different
domains much of import is taking place beneath the language of
exceptions. When talking about the power of a judicial interpreter
to append exceptions to rules in the service of purpose, policy, or
equity, the language of exceptions is often used to disguise what is
no different from a modification or repeal of the previously ex-
isting rule. Here the language of exceptions is used to diminish the
import of the phenomenon. By contrast, the language of exceptions
is commonly used in the First Amendment context not to diminish
but to exaggerate the import of the phenomenon. The archetypal
First Amendment libertarian, recognizing that the power to make
exceptions is the power to change the rule, is wary of exceptions,
although commonly unaware of the contingency of the linguistic
and categorial underpinnings upon which this suspicion rests. Hart
and his followers recognize this contingency, but use the exceptions
language as a way of disguising the assertion of judicial authority
to change the rule.
What these uses of the language of exceptions share, for all
their differences, is a use of that language to mask issues that are
seemingly more basic. When we are talking about statutory design,
the idea of an exception is sometimes a linguistic fortuity, and
sometimes only a reflection of the different roles that law serves
vis-a-vis the pre-legal social and categorial structure on which it
operates. When we are talking about common-law or constitutional
principles, the idea of an exception is much the same, because the
language with which we speak of some principles tracks a less ca-
nonically inscribed but equally contingent categorial structure.
And when we are talking about the ability of judges to create ex-
ceptions, we are really talking more about the central question of
common-law methodology, the ability of judges to modify rules in
the process of application. 5 That question, as with all of these
others, is an important one, but as with the others we must be
wary of the distracting effect of the trivializing phrase.
Exceptions are everywhere in law, but everywhere they are
part and parcel of the rules they are exceptions to. To say this is
7 See Frederick Schauer, Is the Common Law Law?, 77 Cal L Rev 455 (1989).
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not to make normative recommendations about whether exceptions
should be employed more or less than they are now, nor about
when and where they should be used. Nothing of the kind emerges
from what I have said here. The lesson is only that the use or non-
use of an exception is likely to reflect a substantive choice of some
import, and so too with the use or non-use of the language of ex-
ceptions in legal debate. Once we see this, we have the tools availa-
ble to pierce the rhetoric and fortuity of exceptions, and consider
directly these questions of substantive principle and interpretive
authority that the language of exceptions so often obscures.

